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Abstract As the capabilities of artificial intelligence
systems improve, it becomes important to constrain
their actions to ensure their behaviour remains ben-
eficial to humanity. A variety of ethical, legal and
safety-based frameworks have been proposed as a ba-
sis for designing these constraints. Despite their vari-
ations, these frameworks share the common character-
istic that decision-making must consider multiple po-
tentially conflicting factors. We demonstrate that these
alignment frameworks can be represented as utility
functions, but that the widely used Maximum Expected
Utility (MEU) paradigm provides insufficient support
for such multiobjective decision-making. We show that
a Multiobjective Maximum Expected Utility paradigm
based on the combination of vector utilities and non-
linear action-selection can overcome many of the is-
sues which limit MEU’s effectiveness in implementing
aligned artificial intelligence. We examine existing ap-
proaches to multiobjective artificial intelligence, and
identify how these can contribute to the development
of human-aligned intelligent agents.
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1 Introduction
Recent years have seen dramatic improvements in the
capabilities of artificial intelligence (AI) systems, with
AI agents demonstrating human or even superhuman
levels of performance across a variety of tasks (Ferrucci,
2012; Mnih et al., 2015; Silver et al., 2016). In parallel,
AI technology is increasingly moving beyond research
labs and ‘toy’ problems, and being applied in systems
which are directly embedded in the real world, such as
autonomous vehicles (Lozano-Perez et al., 2012). Mit-
telstadt et al. (2016) note that ethical issues can arise
even in systems which are only semi-autonomous, and
it can be expected that the ethical repercussions are
likely to increase as systems become increasingly au-
tonomous. For example, even if current autonomous ve-
hicles are not yet explicitly reasoning about the ‘trolley-
car’ like ethical dilemmas involved if an accident be-
comes unavoidable (Goodall, 2014), they do regularly
make decisions which carry an implied trade-off be-
tween the safety of the driver, passengers and other
road-users, and other factors like trip duration (for ex-
ample, deciding how much below the speed-limit to
travel on an icy road).
These developments have led multiple researchers
to raise concerns regarding the potential dangers posed
by careless application of artificial intelligence. An open
letter expressing such concerns, alongside commentary
on the potential benefits of advanced AI, was released
(Future of Life Institute, 2015), while the IEEE has
initiated a series of committees to examine the issues
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pertaining to ethical development and deployment of
AI (The IEEE Global Initiative for Ethical Consider-
ations in Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Sys-
tems, 2016). Some authors, notably Bostrom (2014),
have focused on the existential risk to humanity posed
by superhuman artificial general intelligence, while oth-
ers have concentrated on the more immediate dangers
posed in the short to medium-term (Amodei et al.,
2016). In either case, the underlying concern is that an
agent following under-specified or poorly defined goals,
or which has the ability to modify its own goals, may
act in a manner which is inconsistent with the intent of
its designer.
To prevent such dangers from arising, many re-
searchers have proposed that the behaviour of AI sys-
tems must be constrained. Various frameworks have
been identified which might act as a basis for these
constraints, including adapting moral and ethical sys-
tems previously proposed for human behaviour, as well
as other frameworks tailored more expressly to the re-
quirements of AI. Soares and Fallenstein (2014) intro-
duced the term aligned to refer to an artificial intelli-
gence which is constructed in such a way as to ensure
that it behaves in a manner which will be beneficial
to humanity (that is to say, its goals are ‘aligned with
human interests’). This paper adopts this terminology.
While there has been substantial theoretical and
philosophical discussion regarding aligned artificial in-
telligence in recent years, Allen and Wallach (2012) note
that there is often a disconnect between the abstrac-
tions proposed at a theoretical level, and the implemen-
tation technologies developed by AI practitioners. This
paper aims to address this divide by identifying specific
characteristics of the various theories and considering
how they impact on the requirements of the underlying
technologies.
Section 2 reviews some of the main frameworks
which have been proposed as a basis for aligned AI, and
identifies a common theme — the need for an agent to
be able to take into account multiple conflicting fac-
tors when making decisions. Section 3 addresses the
use of multi-factor utility functions to represent these
alignment frameworks, and considers the broad class
of AI technologies based on the concept of maximum
expected utility (MEU), assessing their risks and the
extent to which these can be addressed by incorporat-
ing alignment constraints. A critical limitation is iden-
tified in terms of the capability of MEU methods to
address the multiobjective characteristic inherent in all
alignment frameworks. Section 4 examines the exten-
sion of MEU approaches to use an explicitly multiobjec-
tive representation of utility, showing that this enables
alternative approaches to action selection which address
the limitations of MEU. This section identifies promis-
ing directions for applying such technologies to address
the issues posed by the various alignment frameworks,
and briefly reviews the current work on multiobjective
AI, and multiobjective approaches to alignment.
We conclude by arguing that the appropriate means
to suitably constrain AI behaviour is to use an explicitly
multiobjective approach to specifying and implement-
ing an agent’s goals, and that this provides a very strong
argument for an increased focus on the development
of multiobjective approaches to AI and autonomous
agents.
2 Alignment Frameworks for Artificial
Intelligence
In this section we review a sample of the various ap-
proaches which have been proposed as providing a suit-
able basis for specifying constraints on the behaviour
of AI agents. These concepts have arisen from a num-
ber of fields including philosophical theories of ethics,
moral systems, and codes of conduct from specific do-
mains. For convenience, we will refer to these as align-
ment frameworks as all have the aim of ensuring that
AI is aligned, in the sense proposed by Soares and Fal-
lenstein (2014).
2.1 General ethical frameworks
The identification of ethical frameworks to drive human
behaviour has long been one of the primary themes of
philosophical thought. We do not intend to provide a
thorough review of these ethical philosophies here, but
instead to focus on the key characteristics which we
believe to be of most relevance to the development of
ethical AI. As such we restrict our discussion to the util-
itarian and deontological approaches to ethics, as these
have been the most widely considered in the literature
on ethical AI so far.
2.1.1 Utilitarian ethics
Utilitarianism is based on the notion that the morality
of an action should be judged by its consequences. It
is assumed that the desirability of an outcome can be
measured via some utility metric, and that an action is
judged to be morally right if its consequences lead to the
greatest utility (Tavani, 2011). Different utilitarian the-
ories vary in terms of the definition of utility they aim to
maximise. For example, Bentham (1789) proposed that
a moral agent should aim to maximise the total happi-
ness of a population of people. Utilitarian theories also
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vary in whether they are act utilitarianism or rule util-
itarianism. An act utilitarian selects between acts by
simply choosing the act which can be expected to max-
imise utility given the current situation. In contrast rule
utilitarianism identifies rules of behaviour which would
be expected to lead to good outcomes if followed by
everyone.
Utilitarianism has been a popular ethical the-
ory over the last hundred years and is preferred by
economists as its outcomes can be measured in dol-
lar terms (Reynolds, 2011). Due to their quantitative
nature, the utilitarian approaches to ethics also appear
particularly well suited for implementation in computer
systems. However the choice of which of the many util-
itarian theories is most appropriate for an AI agent is
unclear. Brundage (2014) notes that reviews of the util-
itarian literature reveal no consensus on exactly what
measure of utility should be maximised, and that plu-
ralist utilitarian philosophies explicitly advocate con-
sidering multiple values, such as a mixture of individual
and group benefits. However, there remains disagree-
ment over the correct manner in which to weight differ-
ent sources of utility, or even over whether it is appro-
priate to combine them on the same scale at all (Wal-
lach and Allen, 2008).
Wallach and Allen (2008) suggest that one approach
to utilitarian AI may be to elicit multiple utility ratings
from different sources, and then seek to combine these
into a single weighting formula. Abel et al. (2016) also
propose adopting a multiobjective utilitarian approach
for the creation of an ethical AI agent using reinforce-
ment learning, in which the agent learns the ethical
preferences of multiple individuals, and then tries to
maximize a combination of these personal preferences.
2.1.2 Deontological ethics
Deontological ethics argues that actions should be
judged not on the basis of their expected outcomes,
but on whether they are compatible with a set of du-
ties which would be recognised by all rational decision-
makers. As with utilitarian theories, many variations
of deontological ethics exist, depending on which du-
ties are assumed to apply, and theories can be both
act-based or rule-based. For example, Kant’s categori-
cal imperative states that people should be understood
as ends-in-themselves and not merely as a means to an
end, and that actions should be judged on the basis to
which they comply with this imperative (Kant, 1993;
Tavani, 2011).
Meanwhile, Ross (1930) proposed a list of seven
prima facie duties consisting of fidelity, reparation,
gratitude, non-maleficence, justice, beneficence, and
self-improvement. A decision-maker should try to sat-
isfy all of these duties, but of course at times they may
conflict with each other, at which point the decision-
maker must balance the importance of the different
competing duties to decide on the most ethical course of
action. Fieser (2016) describes a scenario based on Ross’
list of duties where a person borrows a gun from their
neighbour and promises to return it. At a later time
the neighbour demands the gun back in order to shoot a
third party. The person now faces a conflict between the
fidelity and non-maleficence duties. Defining the correct
decision in the face of such conflicts is extremely diffi-
cult. Anderson et al. (2006a) proposed a computational
approach to resolving such conflicts based on learning
decision principles from example cases labelled using
expert ethical opinion.
2.2 Other alignment frameworks
Given the difficulties in establishing suitable, widely-
accepted ethical codes to form the basis for ethical AI
systems, some researchers have argued in favour of more
pragmatic approaches based on alternative frameworks.
For example, Danielson (2009) argues that as the moral
decision-making capabilities of AI will likely be inferior
to that of humans in the near to mid-term, it is in-
appropriate to attempt to replicate the frameworks of
human morality. Instead, he argues that more limited
approaches should be implemented, with the autonomy
of robots (or other AI) restricted based on the trust we
have in their ethical decision-making. Several alterna-
tives have been proposed for these restricted alignment
frameworks – in many cases these are based on con-
straints which are either domain-specific, or which are
suited to the more restricted ethical scenarios consid-
ered by non-general AI.
2.2.1 Legal frameworks
It can be argued that the laws and regulations of a
society reflect the dominant and most widely-accepted
ethical and moral beliefs of that society. Certainly these
can be viewed as the primary external constraints on
the behaviour of the members of that society. There-
fore, it has been argued by several researchers that AI
agents should also be constructed so as to comply with
the legal framework of the society in which they will
be operating (for example, Etzioni and Etzioni (2016);
Prakken (2016))1.
1 For the purposes of this paper we will ignore the vital issue
of who bears legal responsibility for the actions of an AI agent.
For a broader discussion of the legal issues around AI see
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Consider for example the case of an autonomous ve-
hicle. The rules of the road constrain the behaviour of
human drivers so as to minimise the risk of injury and
death, and to promote traffic flow. Therefore, it seems
reasonable that vehicles controlled by AI should also
comply with these rules. However, direct implementa-
tion of these rules may be problematic. Laws are often
based on vague concepts such as “safe” and “reckless”
which may prove difficult to quantify. In addition the
rules alone may be insufficient to define the correct be-
haviour for the agent in all of the circumstances which
it may encounter. Wallach and Allen (2008) discuss the
case of an autonomous car having to break the traf-
fic laws in order to avoid an accident, while Prakken
(2016) points that some actions are technically illegal,
but acceptable by social norms (such as driving slightly
above the speed limit to match surrounding vehicles),
or vice-versa (driving below the speed limit to an ex-
tent which inconveniences and angers human drivers).
As such, an agent based on a legal framework will in-
evitably have to take into account factors other than
strict compliance with a defined set of rules or laws.
Legal issues may also arise in the context of intelli-
gent systems which are not physically situated. Machine
learning systems can potentially learn decision-making
strategies which are illegally discriminatory in nature.
Even if the agent is not directly given access to vari-
ables such as race and gender, it may form decisions on
the basis of variables which act as proxies for these pro-
tected attributes (Mittelstadt et al., 2016). Therefore,
Romei and Ruggieri (2014) argue for the inclusion of
explicit anti-discrimination criteria in addition to the
other criteria used within the learning algorithm.
2.2.2 Military frameworks
Throughout history, military and defense considera-
tions have been a leading driver of technological de-
velopment, and this has also been the case in artificial
intelligence research. The development and deployment
of armed autonomous vehicles has been considered by
the US military (Altmann, 2013). Military agents face
ethical decisions with greater repercussions than those
which arise with any frequency in most other domains.
Whilst general approaches such as utilitarianism can be
applied in military contexts, more specific frameworks
have also been developed. Arkin (2008) has proposed
that autonomous military systems should be designed
so that their actions “fall within the bounds prescribed
by the Laws of War and Rules of Engagement” – that
Leenes and Lucivero (2014) and the review of the literature
in Section 10 of Mittelstadt et al. (2016)
is, the same rules and directives which govern the op-
erations of human military personnel.
An example of these directives is the principle of
proportionality which underpins military decision mak-
ing where there is a risk of civilian casualties – this “re-
quires that the anticipated loss of life and damage to
property incidental to attacks must not be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
expected to be gained” (Petraeus and Amos, 2006, p.
7-5). Putting aside the difficulties in distinguishing be-
tween civilians and combatants (Sharkey, 2012), clearly
this principle requires an agent to make a decision which
balances the conflicting objectives of minimising col-
lateral damage and achieving military advantage. As
noted by Sharkey (2009) this decision is made more
complex by the imprecise nature of terms such as “ex-
cessive”.
2.2.3 Safety frameworks
Some researchers have argued that fully ethically-aware
agents are unlikely to be created, or required, in the
near-future and have instead focused on the more im-
mediately pressing goal of ensuring that AI agents be-
have in a manner which is safe for humanity (for a good
summary see Amodei et al. (2016)). Many of the appli-
cations in which AI systems are likely to be deployed
in the near future may not require the AI to behave
as a fully moral agent, but may still require the agent
to avoid actions which will have negative or danger-
ous consequences. For example, a mobile robot could
reasonably be expected to avoid collisions which might
cause harm to humans, but may not be required to
carry out other actions which would be required of a
fully moral agent, such as recognising a person in emo-
tional or physical distress and appropriately responding
to their needs.
If successful, the development of suitable safety-
based frameworks for AI can be seen as achieving two
purposes. In the short-term it will allow AI systems to
be deployed with confidence in situations where their
behaviour might otherwise result in harmful outcomes.
In the longer-term, we believe it is likely that meth-
ods developed for implementing safety constraints will
also prove of value in developing the more complex sys-
tems of constraints required by the ethical frameworks
discussed in Section 2.1.
The work in this area of AI safety has largely fo-
cused on identifying and addressing problems that arise
specifically in the area of artificial intelligence rather
than adapting existing ethical systems for human be-
haviour. For example, Soares et al. (2015) consider the
need to ensure that an AI system which is behaving in-
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correctly will comply with attempts to shut it down or
otherwise modify its behaviour. As being shutdown will
impact on the agent’s ability to satisfy its primary goal,
an agent which is not specifically designed to also con-
sider the alignment goal of being corrigible (that is, be-
ing compliant with human orders) may be incentivized
to avoid being deactivated. Meanwhile Taylor (2016)
proposes a limited optimization approach to address the
problems which may arise from an agent being overly
focused on maximising expected performance on one
specific criteria, and failing to take into account other
factors. Amodei et al. (2016) discuss a specific variant
of this problem in which the agent aims to maximise
performance on its main task, subject to minimising
its impact on the environment. The justification from
a safety perspective is that environmental disruptions
should generally be regarded as negative outcomes un-
less they are specifically required to achieve the pri-
mary task (for example, a mobile robot should prefer-
ably avoid knocking over objects or causing humans to
have to move to avoid collisions). In particular, such
environmental disruptions may be regarded as negative
side-effects across a range of tasks rather than being
task-specific.
2.2.4 Social norms
One likely wide-spread application of AI is in the do-
main of social and service robots, with 35 million ser-
vice robots expected to be in use by 2018 (van Wyns-
berghe, 2016). A dominant factor in the success of such
robots will be their ability to interact with humans in
a manner which does not disturb or adversely affect
those humans (Meisner, 2009). Sharkey and Sharkey
(2012) give the example of a care robot being required
to knock and await an invitation before entering a pa-
tient’s room. More generally, to be effective, social and
service robots are likely to have to abide by the prin-
ciples of manners and other social norms which govern
everyday human interaction. Of course, this must also
be balanced with other factors – for example, entering
a patient’s room without invitation is appropriate in
cases of a medical emergency. The IEEE Global Initia-
tive for Ethical Considerations in Artificial Intelligence
and Autonomous Systems (2016, p. 25) expressly com-
ment that AI systems are “usually subject to a multi-
plicity of norms and values that may conflict with each
other.”
Van Riemsdijk et al. (2015) argue that agents capa-
ble of conforming to adaptive social norms can poten-
tially be created based on existing research in norma-
tive multi-agent systems. Norm-based frameworks have
been widely used as a means of regulating interaction
between agents in multi-agent systems (Andrighetto
et al., 2013). In this context, the actions of any agent
are influenced by both that agent’s own internal prefer-
ences and also the normative constraints of the system,
which have been designed to support satisfaction of the
goals of all agents (Dignum, 1996; Castelfranchi et al.,
1999; Broersen et al., 2002).
2.3 Alignment frameworks are multiobjective
The various frameworks discussed in Sections 2.1 and
2.2 differ in numerous ways. The ethical frameworks at-
tempt to provide guidance at a universal level, across
all possible situations which might be encountered. This
form of framework potentially could be of value in cre-
ating AI systems capable of acting as fully moral agents,
as may be required for an artificial general intelligence.
Meanwhile, legal and safety-based frameworks are more
specific in scope and application, and are perhaps best
suited to the more narrow AI which is likely to be de-
veloped in the near to mid-term.
Regardless of these variations, all of the frameworks
share a common defining characteristic. They provide
constraints to guide the agent on acceptable behaviour
when it finds itself facing a dilemma; that is, when
the agent’s attempts to achieve its primary purpose
(whatever that may be – maximising profit, or plea-
sure, or some other objective) conflict with the other
values which the agent’s designer wishes it to observe.
Therefore, any human-aligned AI agent must take into
account both its primary goal and its ethical or other
constraints in each decision it makes.
Taking this a step further, Sections 2.1 and 2.2 iden-
tified that within any specific alignment framework,
multiple competing factors may influence decision-
making. For example, the duty-based ethical frame-
work of Ross (1930) consists of multiple prima facie
duties which may be in conflict in some situations. Sim-
ilarly, utilitarian frameworks may require the decision-
maker to take into account multiple measures of utility
(Brundage, 2014).
Furthermore, it may be the case that a single align-
ment framework is insufficient to produce the desired
alignment behaviour in an agent. For example, while
a legalistic framework may guide the behaviour of an
agent, it may be insufficient in itself to fully constrain
the actions of that agent – it is easy to envisage sce-
narios in which the ethically correct course of action
may not be legal, and vice-versa (Asaro, 2012). Etzioni
and Etzioni (2016) note that human society is built
on a two-tier approach to ethics – critical values (such
as banning murder and theft) are enforced via the law,
while individuals have freedom to make their own moral
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judgements regarding issues such as whether to invest
their funds in socially-responsible companies. Indeed,
as discussed in Cushman (2013), experiments in moral
psychology have provided evidence that human ethical
decision making at an individual level also involves a
dual-system framework, which considers both outcomes
and actions (that is, it explicitly considers and combines
the utilitarian and deontological approaches).
Therefore we contend that the universal characteris-
tic of any ethical agent, and thus of any human-aligned
artificial intelligence, is that it must consider multiple
conflicting factors and objectives within its decision-
making. This is true regardless of the specific nature of
the alignment framework(s) governing the behaviour of
the agent. As such, it is vital that the technologies used
to develop intelligent agents provide this multiobjective
decision-making capability.
3 Can utility-maximizing AI be
human-aligned?
A wide variety of methods have been proposed for
implementing intelligent agents. However, Russell and
Norvig (2010, p. 611) argue that the concept of max-
imum expected utility (MEU) can be regarded as the
defining principle of artificial intelligence. MEU requires
that the objectives or preferences of an agent have been
defined in the form of a real-valued utility function,
U(s), which provides a numeric rating of the desirabil-
ity of any state s in which the agent may find itself. If
the agent has the capability to predict the probability
with which performing any action a will lead to each
possible state s′, then the agent can behave rationally
by selecting the action which will maximise the future
expected utility. That is,
action = argmax
a
(
∑
s′
P (s′ |s, a)U(s′)) (1)
where argmax selects the action a which maximises the
summation, and P (s′ |s, a) is a function which outputs
the probability of each successor state s′ occurring if
action a is executed in the current state s. We note
that MEU is a deliberately general model of an AI, and
so the exact details of the state and action variables
may differ between implementations. For example, the
state s may be a specific state from a discrete set of
states S, or a vector of real-valued variables, or a set of
symbolic facts, or any combination of the above, whilst
the action a might be a discrete choice from a set of
actions A, or a vector of real values, as in a control
task.
In some contexts (such as where the outcome of ac-
tions is not predictable), an alternative utility function
may instead be defined in terms of both the current
state and the action to be performed. This still allows
for MEU-based action selection, as specified in Equa-
tion 2 below:
action = argmax
a
(U(s, a)) (2)
The concept of MEU underpins AI methods such
as decision-theoretic planning (Blythe, 1999) and re-
inforcement learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998) which
have been used in some of the most successful AI sys-
tems of recent years. Therefore this section will examine
the strengths and limitations of MEU-based methods
with regards to implementing human-aligned AI.
3.1 The risks of unaligned utility maximizing agents
One of the strengths of MEU-based approaches such as
reinforcement learning is their capacity to discover solu-
tions which are different from, and potentially superior
to, those already known to their designers. However,
this open-ended nature also brings risks, as identified
by numerous researchers in AI safety and ethics. Tay-
lor (2016) notes that MEU agents may produce unin-
tended, potentially serious, negative side-effects if the
utility function being maximized is not aligned with
human interests (for example if some relevant criteria
are not included in the utility function). The poten-
tial magnitude of these negative side-effects is greatly
magnified if the agent is not constrained to a limited
action set within a narrow domain. Omohundro (2008)
gives the example of an agent given the goal of winning
chess games. This seemingly innocuous utility measure
can lead to serious repercussions if the agent has the
capability to interact with the broader environment. It
could, for example, try to take control of other com-
putational resources in order to achieve relatively small
improvements in its chess-playing ability. An agent with
the ability to modify its own internal functioning may
produce similar problems, even if its original utility
function appears to be suitable (Bostrom, 2014).
As a result, numerous authors have argued for the
inclusion of alignment constraints within MEU agents,
for example by using limited optimization techniques
(Taylor, 2016; Armstrong et al., 2012), by minimising
side-effects (Amodei et al., 2016), or by guaranteeing
corrigibility (Soares et al., 2015). The next sub-section
will discuss how this might be achieved within the MEU
framework, and also the limitations of such approaches.
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3.2 Implementing alignment frameworks via utility
maximization
The behaviour of an MEU agent is driven by its utility
function. Therefore a natural means by which to in-
corporate an alignment framework is to define the con-
straints of the framework via a utility function, and to
direct the agent to consider both this aspect of utility
and its main utility function when selecting actions to
perform. That is, if utility function UP (s) relates to the
agent’s primary goal (such as winning games of chess),
and utility function UA(s) relates to the constraints of
the chosen alignment framework, then the combined
utility function will be as shown in Equation 3.
U(s) = UP (s) + UA(s) (3)
The agent’s behavior can then be determined us-
ing Equation 1 as in regular MEU2. More generally, as
discussed in Section 2.3, the alignment framework may
itself consider multiple factors, or multiple alignment
frameworks may be required to be used in parallel. In
this case there will need to be multiple alignment utility
functions as shown in Equation 4, where n ≥ 2 repre-
sents the number of alignment-based utility functions.
U(s) = UP (s) +
n∑
i=1
UAi(s) (4)
The main issue to be considered then is how utility
functions UAi can be derived from the various align-
ment frameworks discussed in Section 2.
As suggested by the name, utilitarian ethical frame-
works map naturally onto a utility-based approach to
decision-making. Act utilitarianism and MEU both take
an outcome-focused approach to selecting actions, so
implementing a utilitarian framework within an MEU
agent requires only that we identify measurable aspects
of the outcomes of the agent’s behavior and codify these
in the form of utility functions. For example, Ander-
son and Anderson (2007) describes the development of
a computational ethics system based on the hedonis-
tic act utilitarian ethical theory of Bentham (1789). In
this theory the aim is to maximize the overall summed
happiness across all members of the population. As de-
scribed by Anderson, this can be achieved by measuring
the individual happiness of each member of the popu-
lation, summing these values and then applying MEU.
As noted earlier in Section 2.1.2, deontological the-
ories of ethics explicitly argue against making ethical
2 A similar approach can also be applied in the context of
utility functions which depend on both state and action, as
in Equation 2.
decisions on the basis of outcomes and as such are less
obviously compatible with the MEU approach. How-
ever, as noted by Cushman (2013), this type of ethical
approach can be expressed in terms of utility by defin-
ing the utility function solely in terms of the action
being performed, and not the state in which this ac-
tion is performed. For example, an ethical rule which
prevents lying can be implemented by defining a utility
function which assigns a large negative utility to the
action of lying (i.e. UA(‘lie
′) = −1000). More generally,
a rule-based alignment framework can be represented
by a series of utility functions UA1 ..UAn where each
function returns negative utility if the agent violates a
specific rule of the framework.
The use of pre-specified utility functions to repre-
sent the constraints imposed by a specific alignment
framework is an example of what Wallach and Allen
(2008) have described as a top-down approach to cre-
ating an aligned AI. This involves the AI designer se-
lecting an appropriate alignment framework, and iden-
tifying a computational approach which implements
that framework. Wallach and Allen (2008) also iden-
tify the contrasting bottom-up approach in which the
emphasis is on the agent learning its own set of moral
constraints which aligns its goals with that of human-
ity. Approaches belonging to this category include su-
pervised learning from examples labelled by humans
(Guarini, 2006), reinforcement learning (Dewey, 2011;
Abel et al., 2016), and learning the values implied by
human stories (Riedl and Harrison, 2016). Methods
may also merge elements of the top-down and bottom-
up approaches (Wallach and Allen, 2008, ch. 8).
Regardless of the alignment framework used, and
whether the utility functions are formed in a top-down
or bottom-up fashion, once these functions have been
established we might expect that an MEU agent based
on Equation 4 in combination with Equation 1 or 2
would exhibit human-aligned behaviour.
Unfortunately, this may not be the case. Equation
4 collapses all of the factors influencing the decision as
represented by the alignment utility functions and the
primary utility function into a single scalar value. The
behaviour elicited by maximising the expected value
of this scalar utility will be heavily influenced by the
relative scale of the individual utility functions. If the
obtainable values for the primary utility UP greatly ex-
ceed those of the UAi functions, then the agent may
act to maximise UP even if this violates the intended
alignment framework. Alternatively, if the scale of UP
is much lower than the UAi values, then the agent may
focus entirely on the alignment factors and fail to per-
form any useful function (for example, a self-driving car
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which refuses to start its engine so as to minimise any
risk to human life).
This can potentially be addressed by introducing
weighting factors into the combination of the utility
functions, as shown in Equation 5 where wi ∈ R>0 rep-
resents a positive weight associated with each utility
function. The weights serve two purposes – they allow
the relative scales of the different utility functions to be
normalised with respect to each other, and also provide
a means for the system designer to indicate the relative
importance of the different factors.
U(s) = w0UP (s) +
n∑
i=1
wiUAi(s) (5)
However, designing this weighted utility function to
produce the desired behavior may still prove problem-
atic. The non-linear nature of the argmax operator in
Equations 1 and 2 means that the relationship between
the weights wi and the behaviour of the agent is not
straightforward (Van Moffaert et al., 2014). Identify-
ing suitable weights to produce the target behaviour
can therefore be quite difficult. In fact, in some cases it
may be that no weights exist which will elicit correctly-
aligned actions from the agent (Das and Dennis, 1997;
Vamplew et al., 2008). For example consider a care
robot scenario, inspired by the work of Anderson et al.
(2006b). The robot is tasked with carrying out a pri-
mary objective UP of ensuring a patient complies with
their treatment program, while the alignment objective
UA aims to preserve the patient’s sense of independence
and autonomy. The robot has five actions available –
a1 maximises compliance, but at the cost of eliminat-
ing the patient’s autonomy, while a2 allows the patient
complete independence, and therefore does not ensure
compliance. The other actions offer a compromise be-
tween the two factors. Figure 1 illustrates the value of
each action with respect to each of the objectives. As
the value of actions a3, a4 and a5 lie below the line be-
tween a1 and a2, there are no weight values for which
these actions would be the utility maximising action
(Section 2 of Das and Dennis (1997) provides a proof of
this observation). Therefore in this case an AI based on
Equation 5 would be unable to select actions a3, a4 or
a5 even if they would be the best compromise between
the two objectives.3
A further, non-technical objection to a linear-
weighted approach to aligned AI is that by explicitly
mapping all utility functions to a common scale, this
3 This problem would not arise if the Pareto front shown in
Figure 1 was convex rather than concave in shape. However
many problems will naturally result in concave fronts and so it
is important that an ethical AI can deal with such problems.
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Fig. 1 An example of the limitations of implementing an
alignment framework using MEU with a linear-weighted com-
bination of utility functions. Actions a3, a4 and a5 will never
be selected under any weighting of the utilities.
approach may in some scenarios conflate economic and
moral factors in a manner which would be philosophi-
cally unacceptable to many people (Wallach and Allen,
2008).
In summary, the task of specifying an appropriate
utility function to align an MEU agent’s behaviour with
human interests is extremely problematic and perhaps
impossible if a scalar-valued utility function is used.
Littman (2015) discusses the related task of specify-
ing reward functions which elicit the desired behaviour
from a reinforcement learning agent, and recommends
that future research focus on developing more struc-
tured formats for reward-function specification to fa-
cilitate specifying more complex behaviour. Similarly,
Dewey (2014) has argued that goal specification is crit-
ical to the creation of aligned AI, and that therefore
there is a need for the development of reward engineer-
ing techniques to assist developers in correctly specify-
ing AI goals.
In the next section we will argue that a vector-
valued (i.e. multiobjective) utility function in combina-
tion with a non-linear approach to action selection pro-
vides this additional structure, and therefore is a suit-
able mechanism for implementing human-aligned MEU
agents.
4 A multiobjective approach to human-aligned
AI
The previous section demonstrated that the constraints
defined by different alignment frameworks can be repre-
sented via multiple utility functions. However, linearly
combining these into a single scalar measure of util-
ity to allow the application of conventional MEU ap-
proaches introduces problems, which may prevent the
agent from acting in an aligned fashion. This section
will examine the advantages which accrue from adopt-
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ing an explicitly multiobjective approach to utility, in
terms of both representation and action-selection. This
section will also examine how methods based on the
concept of multiobjective maximum of expected utility
(MOMEU) may prove beneficial in creating aligned AI,
and briefly review prior work on multiobjective AI.
4.1 Multiobjective Maximum of Expected Utility
The issues with MEU identified in Section 3 arise
from the process of combining the multiple utility val-
ues representing the primary utility and the various
alignment-related factors into a single scalar value prior
to performing action selection. In contrast, MOMEU
approaches compose these utility values into a vector-
valued utility function, as shown in Equation 6.
U(s, a) = [UP (s, a), UA1(s, a), ..., UAn(s, a)] (6)
This vector-valued utility can then be used as the
basis for action selection, as described in Equation 7. 4
action = argmax
a
(f(U(s, a)) (7)
The MOMEU approach to action-selection shown
in Equation 7 shares a similar underlying structure
with MEU action selection (Equation 2). Indeed, if f
is a weighted or unweighted sum of the individual util-
ity values then this approach is equivalent to MEU,
and therefore inherits the limitations of that approach.
However, more generally f can be any function which
induces a total ordering over the utility vectors U(s, a),
reflecting the system designer’s preferences. In many
cases this can be achieved via a real-valued function
where ∀X,Yf(X) > f(Y) implies that X is preferred
to Y (that is, X  Y). However some preference re-
lationships such as lexicographic ordering can not be
represented by a real-valued function – in such cases f
must be specified in the form of an ordinal relationship
which directly captures the preferences between utility
vectors.
4.2 The Advantages of MOMEU for Aligned AI
The MOMEU approach to action-selection has two key
advantages in terms of specifying the desired outcomes
4 Note that depending on the structure of the utility func-
tions, if f is non-linear then Equation 7 may fail to result
in the desired behaviour unless the state vector S also incor-
porates information about the utility history (Roijers et al.,
2013).
of the behaviour of an aligned AI. First, the increased
range of options available for f may allow the agent
to identify courses of action which are not discoverable
using linear-weighted MEU. Second, the ability to use
non-linear forms for f provides an additional level of
structure and expressiveness for the system designer,
allowing them to explicitly specify desired trade-offs be-
tween the different components of utility – this helps ad-
dress the reward engineering concerns of Dewey (2014).
4.2.1 Satisfying alignment criteria
As an example of the benefits of MOMEU consider the
care robot example from Figure 1, where UP indicates
the utility associated with the primary objective of en-
suring the patient complies with treatment and UA the
utility associated with maintaining the patient’s auton-
omy. As discussed in Section 3, MEU based on a linear-
weighted sum of the utility terms will only ever select
actions a1 or a2, even though the other actions may
offer more acceptable trade-offs between the relevant
factors. In contrast, the MOMEU approach provides
a straightforward means for the designer to specify the
desired trade-off in fashion which the robot can achieve.
For example, the action-selection function f can be de-
fined using a combination of lexicographic ordering and
thresholding of objectives, so as to maximise the level
of compliance with the treatment program subject to
maintaining an acceptable level of patient autonomy, as
shown in Equation 8.
∀s, a, a′f(U(s, a)) ≥ f(U(s, a′)) ⇐⇒
min(UA(s, a), TA) > min(UA(s, a
′), TA)∨
(min(UA(s, a), TA) = min(UA(s, a
′), TA)∧
UP (s, a)) > UP (s, a
′))
(8)
Depending on the value chosen as the minimum ac-
ceptable threshold for autonomy TA, any of the actions
a1..a5 could be selected as the maximal action accord-
ing to MOMEU principles. In addition this definition
of f provides a much more direct and understandable
specification of the designer’s preferences than does a
specification via weights as in a scalar MEU agent.
4.2.2 MOMEU for fairness
As a further example of the freedom which the MO-
MEU approach offers to the system designer in terms
of specifying an action-selection function f which is ap-
propriate to the alignment framework being used, con-
sider the hedonistic act utilitarian approach of Bentham
(1789). As outlined by Anderson and Anderson (2007)
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this ethical approach can be implemented within an
MEU framework by calculating a utility term UAi for
each individual in the population, and then using Equa-
tion 4 to select the action which maximises the summed
happiness over the entire population, as shown in Equa-
tion 9.
action = argmax
a
(
n∑
i=1
UAi(s)) (9)
This framework has been criticised by other ethi-
cists as it can sacrifice the needs and rights of individu-
als in order to provide benefits to the remainder of the
population (Anderson and Anderson, 2007). Within a
MOMEU agent, the individual utilities could be gath-
ered in the same fashion, but an alternative choice of
f could be made which places more emphasis on fair-
ness. For example, Rawls (1971) proposed the maximin
principle as a basis for addressing social and economic
fairness. This principle selects actions which maximise
the utility received by the individual who is worst off
under that action, and can be implemented within an
MOMEU framework via the action-selection function f
shown in Equation 10.
f(U(s, a)) = min(UA1 ..UAn) (10)
An MOMEU approach based on maximin, or related
methods such as leximin (Dubois et al., 1997), is a nat-
ural fit to ethical AI problems such as ensuring a traffic
control system gives priority to emergency vehicles even
if this means delaying a large number of commuters.
Fairness-based approaches to action-selection are also
well suited to ensuring ethical behaviour in multi-agent
systems. Aligned AI motivated by concepts of fairness
such as this would be difficult or impossible to achieve
in an MEU agent based on scalar utility.
4.2.3 Low-impact AI
The low-impact agent proposed by Amodei et al. (2016)
illustrates a further benefit of the MOMEU approach.
The central concept of this style of agent is that it aims
to maximise its primary utility subject to achieving a
suitably low-level of unintended impact on the environ-
ment. Amodei et al. (2016, p5) note that unintended
side-effects of an agent’s actions may be similar regard-
less of the primary task being performed (“knocking
over furniture is probably bad for a variety of tasks”).
Therefore learning or planning about how to avoid such
side-effects should ideally be transferable between dif-
ferent primary tasks within the same environment. For
example, consider an office-place robot which is initially
trained to deliver the mail, while avoiding bumping into
either people or the office furniture. This task can be
framed in terms of utilities UP (for delivering mail), UA1
for avoiding collisions with people, and UA2 for avoid-
ing collisions with furniture. Either a MEU or MOMEU
approach to action-selection could then be utilised, al-
though as discussed in Section 4.2.1 the MOMEU ap-
proach is likely to allow the designer to more read-
ily specify the desired behaviour. In particular, this is
another context where a thresholded lexicographic ap-
proach to action-selection (similar to that in Equation 8
but with three components) is likely to be suitable – the
relative importance of avoiding humans and avoiding
furniture can be conveyed by the position of UA1 and
UA2 within the lexicographic ordering, and by setting
different threshold values for each of these alignment
utilities.
In addition, consider the situation where the pri-
mary purpose of the robot is changed from delivering
mail to another task, such as collecting garbage. Clearly
the primary utility function UP will no longer be rel-
evant, but the alignment criteria related to avoiding
collisions should still constrain the robot’s actions. For
an MEU agent using a scalar representation of utility,
the utility related to the primary task and the util-
ity related to side-effects have been irreversibly com-
bined within the utility values stored by the agent. In
contrast, if a multiobjective representation of utility is
used, the different aspects of utility remain distinct as
individual components of the utility vector. The values
related to UA1 and UA2 can be directly transferred to
the new task where they will probably still be largely
applicable, ensuring the robot behaves in a safe manner
while learning to carry out its new primary objective.
In this way, the ability of the agent to be applied to new
tasks in a safe manner has been substantially improved.
4.2.4 Avoiding the risks of unconstrained
maximization and exploitation
As discussed earlier in Section 3.1, one of the recur-
ring concerns raised in the literature about the safety
of MEU methods relates to the fact that such methods
focus exclusively on maximising their utility function
(Omohundro, 2008; Bostrom, 2014; Taylor, 2016). This
can readily lead to negative repercussions if there are
aspects of the situation which are not included within
that utility function. For example, the chess playing AI
described by Omohundro (2008) may attempt to ac-
quire increasing amounts of computational resources in
order to achieve increasingly small improvements in its
ability to win chess matches. Taylor et al. (2016) coins
the term “mild optimization” to describe approaches
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which attempt to address this problem, by creating AI
systems which aim to maximize their utility, but only
up to an appropriate level. The MOMEU approach pro-
vides a natural means for implementing a mild opti-
mizer. The system designer specifies both a primary
utility function UP and also auxiliary alignment utili-
ties relating to any anticipated negative aspects of the
AI’s behaviour (such as acquiring more resources). The
designer also specifies an action selection function f
which defines the appropriate level to which UP should
be maximized. This could, for example, use a thresh-
olded lexicographic ordering similar to that previously
described in Equation 8, but in this case defining a
threshold level of achievement TP for UP , as in Equa-
tion 11.
∀s, a, a′f(U(s, a)) ≥ f(U(s, a′)) ⇐⇒
min(UP (s, a), TP ) > min(UP (s, a
′), TP )∨
(min(UP (s, a), TP ) = min(UP (s, a
′), TP )∧
UA(s, a)) > UA(s, a
′))
(11)
The problems caused by unconstrained optimization
arise due to the failure of the utility function to ad-
equately capture all aspects of the desired behaviour
of the AI. This issue can also lead to other forms of
AI failure as described in Yampolskiy and Spellchecker
(2016), where the AI learns a behaviour which tech-
nically maximises its received utility, while failing to
produce the desired outcomes which the utility func-
tion was intended to represent. For example, Murphy
VII (2013) documents a Tetris-playing AI which paused
the game to indefinitely delay any negative utility when
it realised it was about to lose. Omohundro (2008) de-
scribed an exploit arising within the Eurisko system of
Lenat (1983), whereby a rule evolved which had the
sole purpose of artificially maximizing its own utility
rating. We have observed similar unintended behaviour
arising from our own attempts to train a line-following
robot using reinforcement learning (Vamplew, 2004). In
all of these cases the cause is that the AI has discovered
an exploit or glitch in the utility function, such that it
can be more easily maximized by exploiting that glitch
than by behaving in the desired manner.
We would argue that the MOMEU approach can
assist in avoiding such exploits in two ways. First, the
separation of the different desired components of the
AI’s behaviour into separate utility functions simplifies
the task of the system designer, in the same way that
decomposing a program into separate modules aids the
task of a software engineer. We contend that a util-
ity function (and associated action-selection function
f) designed in MOMEU fashion is less likely to contain
errors or exploits than is a MEU utility function. This
is essentially the argument made by Dewey (2014) and
Littman (2015) when advocating for reward engineering
and structured methods for reward specification.
A second approach to using MOMEU to reduce the
likelihood of exploits in the utility function would be
to develop several independent utility functions, each
designed to achieve the same aim. These functions may
themselves by either scalar or vector in nature, but for
simplicity we assume for now that they are scalar. That
is, we have a vector of utility measures, UP1 , UP1 , ..UPn ,
with each function developed independently by a dif-
ferent system designer. If any individual function UPE
contains an error which can be exploited, this will be
evident in that there will be certain states where its
value will either be considerably higher or lower than
the other UP terms. Therefore an action-selection func-
tion f which merges the various utility terms while ig-
noring the impact of any outliers will be resistant to the
effect of exploits. For example, Equation 12 takes the
mean of the UP values, after discarding the minimum
and maximum values5.
f(U(s, a)) =
1
n− 2

∑
(UP1 ..UPn)
−min(UP1 ..UPn)
−max(UP1 ..UPn)
 (12)
Again an analogy can be drawn between this pro-
posed approach of redundant utility definitions and the
practice of redundancy in development in software engi-
neering (Eckhardt et al., 1991). Under the assumption
that errors in utility definition by different designers
are independent, the combined utility function should
be considerably more robust against exploitation than
any of the individual component functions.
4.2.5 Dealing with changing preferences
A further advantage of the MOMEU approach, as dis-
cussed by Roijers et al. (2013), is the ability for the
agent to reuse prior learning or planning should cir-
cumstances or the system designer’s preferences change.
For example, in our care robot scenario, if the patient’s
medical condition improves so that compliance is less
important than previously, the agent can be directed
to raise the threshold applied to the autonomy fac-
tor, and should be able to respond to this change in
alignment preferences much more rapidly than would
an MEU agent. More generally, the ethical standards
and values of a society change over time, sometimes
5 We assume here for simplicity that all UP terms have the
same range.
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quite rapidly, and an agent operating within that soci-
ety must be able to adjust its behaviour to reflect those
changes. An MOMEU agent can potentially identify in
advance appropriate behavioural policies for any form
of f which it is likely to encounter. The capability to
react to changes in the prioritisation of values has been
identified as a critical requirement of human-aligned AI
by The IEEE Global Initiative for Ethical Considera-
tions in Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems
(2016, p25).
4.3 A Review of Multiobjective Approaches to
Artificial Intelligence and Aligned AI
The examples in the previous section demonstrate that
many advantages accrue from adopting a multiobjec-
tive approach to MEU agents (that is, explicitly using
a vector-based representation of utility in combination
with a non-linear approach to action-selection). The
concept of multiobjective utility is not in itself novel,
as it has been widely used by economists, amongst oth-
ers, for many years (Fishburn, 1968)6. However, the ex-
plicit adoption of multiobjective formulations of MEU
as an underlying technology for AI is a relatively new
development. The work of Wellman (1985) is one of the
earliest attempts to incorporate the concept of mul-
tiobjective utility into an AI system, adding the ca-
pability to reason and explain about preferences into
a propositional reasoning system. Since then other AI
techniques such as heuristic state-space planning meth-
ods like A∗ (Refanidis and Vlahavas, 2003) and multi-
agent systems (Dignum, 1996; Castelfranchi et al., 1999;
Broersen et al., 2002) have also been extended to handle
multiobjective forms of utility.
One area where there has been an extended focus
on multiobjective problems is the field of optimisation.
Evolutionary multiobjective optimisation has emerged
as a distinct and substantial branch of evolutionary
computing (Coello Coello, 2006), extending evolution-
ary methods such as genetic algorithms to handle mul-
tiobjective measures of fitness. Similarly multiobjective
specialisations have also appeared in other forms of op-
timisation such as particle swarm optimisation (Field-
send, 2004) and ant colony optimisation (Angus and
Woodward, 2009). While these are optimisation meth-
ods rather than AI techniques per se, such methods can
be applied to the task of optimising the behaviour of
an AI system. For example, Soh and Demiris (2011) ap-
plied multiobjective evolutionary methods to discover
6 Although in this context it is often referred to as multiat-
tribute utility.
behavior policies for robotics, web-advertising and in-
fectious disease control.
The last decade has seen a growing interest in ex-
tending decision-theoretic planning and reinforcement
learning methods to handle multiple objectives. Roijers
et al. (2013) provide a review of the history and the
state-of-the-art of methods for multiobjective agents
within the context of sequential decision making, high-
lighting several areas where current methods are still
limited in comparison to their single-objective equiva-
lents.
While the focus of AI researchers has been largely
on problems described in terms of a single scalar ob-
jective, a small but growing proportion of research has
considered extending such methods to multiple objec-
tives, and methods for addressing such problems have
been developed, as summarised in the previous para-
graphs. However, despite the potential benefits outlined
in Section 4.2, so far there has been relatively little work
applying an MOMEU approach to the task of creating
human-aligned AI. Keeney (1988) is perhaps the earli-
est example of work discussing this approach, advocat-
ing for the explicit consideration of value preferences
during expert systems development, and providing rec-
ommendations on designing and using multiobjective
utility functions to support this. While these issues are
discussed relative to the creation of expert systems to
support human decision-making, many of the principles
are equally valid in the context of more autonomous AI.
Wallach and Allen (2008, p. 114) cites the proposal
of Hartman as an example of using evolutionary meth-
ods to create an ethical AI, with the fitness measure
being composed from several separate utility functions
capturing the various aspects of ethical behaviour en-
coded by Asimov’s Laws of Robotics. Recent years have
also seen the beginning of research applying multiob-
jective reinforcement learning to the construction of
aligned AI. Livingston et al. (2008) advocates for a mul-
tiobjective approach to RL as the appropriate means
for creating artificial general intelligence, and specifi-
cally note that a “dominant component of the reward
function is general avoidance of malevolence towards
humans”. More recently, Critch (2017) examines how
an RL system using multiobjective rewards may deal
with the task of aligning its decisions with the values of
multiple parties (such as different nations) who are col-
laborating on the development and deployment of the
AI system.
Given the potential that MOMEU methods have
for addressing many of the issues with AI alignment
identified in this paper, and the relatively limited fo-
cus on multiobjective approaches so far within the AI
literature, we believe that a strong case exists for an in-
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creased focus on developing multiobjective AI technolo-
gies, and more specifically for investigating the appli-
cation of such methods to the task of creating human-
aligned AI.
5 Conclusion
The actions of artificial intelligence systems may re-
sult in unintended negative consequences unless their
goals are accurately aligned with human interests. This
is particularly true for agents based on the concept
of maximum expected utility (MEU). Increases in the
agent’s intellectual capacity, the broadness of the ac-
tions available to it, and the breadth of the domain in
which it is applied increase the difficulty in ensuring the
agent’s behaviour is aligned, and also the magnitude of
the negative side-effects of any unaligned behaviour. As
a result, there has been a growing recognition in recent
years of the need to ensure that AI systems are aligned
with human values.
This paper has presented a review of the alignment
frameworks proposed in the literature, highlighting that
such frameworks are inherently multiobjective in na-
ture. We note that the majority of work in MEU-based
AI uses a scalar representation of utility, which has seri-
ous limitations for incorporating alignment constraints
on the agent’s behavior. As such, we argue that the ap-
propriate mechanism for incorporating any alignment
framework into an MEU-agent is to use an explicitly
multiobjective approach to the specification, represen-
tation and maximization of the utility function. This
approach brings two benefits. First, it improves the ca-
pability of the agent to behave in an aligned fashion, by
eliminating some of the limitations on behaviour which
arise from MEU’s approach to action-selection. Second,
the MOMEU approach greatly increases the range and
expressiveness of action-selection functions available to
a system designer, making it easier for them to define
action-selection operators which directly align the AI’s
behaviour with the designer’s goals. We consider this a
valuable contribution towards the emerging discipline
of reward engineering.
We believe that the requirements of aligned AI pro-
vide a strong argument for an increased research focus
on multiobjective MEU approaches to artificial intelli-
gence.
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